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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DIANNA BROADBENT,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
CACHE COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 950241-CA
930000119
Priority No. 15

:
:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over this appeal

is conferred upon the Utah

Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1994)

Pursuant to

Utah Code §78-2-2(4) (1994), and Utah Code §78-2a-3 (2) (k) (1994),
this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by reason of the
transfer of this action from the Supreme Court of Utah to the Utah
Court of Appeals.

Rule 42, Utah R. App. P.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue is whether the lower court correctly concluded there
was no genuine issue of material fact as to (1) whether Broadbent's
tort claim for wrongful discharge is barred by the Governmental
Immunity Act, sections

63-30-1, et

seq.; and

(2) whether

her

supposition that there is a private right of action based on an

alleged violation of the provisions of the Educator Evaluation Act,
sections 53A-10-101, et seq., is similarly barred.
Standard of Review:

The trial court judge's determination

that there are no disputed issues of material

fact precluding

summary judgment is a conclusion of law reviewed for correctness.
Neiderhauser Builders and Development Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d
1193, 1195 (Utah App. 1992); accord Weese v. Davis County Comm'n,
834 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1992).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The determinative provisions are Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1, et
seq.; 53A-10-101 through 110; and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

These provisions are reproduced in Addendum A to

this Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a final judgment on an order dated
October 13, 1994, of the First Judicial District Court of Cache
County, the Honorable Gordon J. Low presiding, granting summary
judgment to defendant Board of Education of the Cache County School
District ("the District" or "the School District") on Broadbent's
tort claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
and violation of the Educator Evaluation Act when her employment as
a provisional teacher was not renewed.
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
Broadbent filed her complaint against the District on August
19, 1993 and claimed two bases for recovery:
2

First, she argued she

was entitled to recovery under the public policy exception to the
employment at-will doctrine; second, she alleged an implied private
cause of action would lie for violation of the Educator Evaluation
Act, sections 53A-10-101, et seq.

R. 2 - 7.

The District answered and discovery ensued. On June 24, 1994,
the District moved for summary judgment on the basis that (1) the
School District is immune from the tort of wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy; (2) plaintiff failed to file a timely
statutory notice of claim with respect to her wrongful discharge
claim; (3) plaintiff's Title 53A chapter 10 claim fails because (a)
there is no waiver of immunity for a suit based on an alleged
violation of its provisions, (b) there is no express or implied
private right of action under this code section, (c) this section
does nothing to alter the contractual relationship between the
parties, and

(d) plaintiff's testimony indicated clearly that

attempts at remediation as envisioned by Title 53A chapter 10 would
have been futile.

R. 43 - 57, and attachments.

On August 26, 1994, Judge Low issued a Memorandum Decision
finding specifically that Broadbent's claim under the public policy
exception to the employment at-will doctrine was barred as a tort
claim against a governmental entity performing a governmental
function.

Additionally, the Judge found there was no basis for

recovery under U.C.A. Title 53A, Chapter 10 which "includes no
provisions for private causes of action to the tort of wrongful
discharge, provides no claim of relief, and gives no reference to
the establishment of a contractual right under the statute."
3

R.

195 - 205, at 201.
Final judgment in favor of the District was entered on October
13, 1994.

R. 207.

1994.

210.

R.

Broadbent filed this appeal on September 22,

Statement of Facts
Undisputed Facts.
1. The School District is a governmental entity performing a
governmental function.
That the defendant in this action, the Board of Education of
the

Cache

County

School

District,

is

a

governmental

entity

performing a core governmental function is uncontested by either
party.
2. Broadbent was a provisional teacher with no contractual
modification of her at-will status.
Broadbent
District

was

understood
on

a

that her employment

"year by year

basis"

and

with the
that

School

she was

a

provisional, rather than tenured, educator. Broadbent depo. at 27,
28, attached to the School District's Memorandum in Support of Its
Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 43 - 57.

Moreover, Broadbent

understood that as a provisional teacher, the District could decide
not to renew her contract for any reason.

Jd. , Broadbent depo. at

29.
Furthermore, according to the negotiated

contract

between

Cache County School District and the teachers union representing
Broadbent, new employees of the School District were informed that
during the three years as provisional employees, "they shall be
without the right of expectation of continued employment."
4

Id. ,

Section III.7.6.b.; in accord Section III.10.9.a.1. also attached
to the District's Memorandum.

Broadbent testified that she had

never been told that merely because she had good evaluations, her
employment would be renewed, .Id., Broadbent depo. at 38, nor that
without

evaluation

and

the

opportunity

for remediation, her

provisional status could not be terminated, Broadbent depo. at 42 43.

Broadbent offered no evidence of contractual modification of

her at-will employment with the School District.
3. Broadbent was advised in writing, prior to the end of her
term as a provisional teacher, that her employment would not be
renewed.
On March 31, 1992, Broadbent was given two months' notice that
her contract with the School District would not be renewed for the
1992-1993 school year.

Memorandum Decision, R. 196; Appellant's

Brief, pp. 6, 11. Her teaching status, at the time of notification
of non-renewal, was "provisional."

Id.

Disputed Facts.
A.

Reasons for non-renewal.

Broadbent claims her employment was not renewed because she
acted as an advocate for the special needs of a child. Appellant's
Brief, p. 10.

The School District claims Broadbent's employment

was not renewed because she was insubordinate and that the District
was acting in the best interests of the child.

R. 43-57

This dispute, however, is immaterial to the court's resolution
of the District's motion for summary judgment since even if
Broadbent's claims rise to the level of a clear and substantial
public policy violation, the claim for wrongful discharge of an at5

will employee sounds in tort, not contract, and is therefore barred
by the Governmental Immunity Act.
B.

Whether the Educator Evaluation Act provisions were met.

Broadbent
documentation

claims

she

identifying

was
alleged

never

provided

deficiencies,

improvement, or a consulting educator.

with

written

resources

for

Appellant's Brief, p. 11.

The District argues Broadbent was not a candidate for remediation
since during her deposition, two years after her contract was not
renewed, she remained firm in her position that she would again
ignore her supervisor's direct orders if she disagreed with them.
R.

43 - 57.
This factual dispute is also immaterial because Broadbent had

no expectation of continued employment, and the Educator Evaluation
Act

("EEA") does not create a private right of action for which

immunity is waived.
Standard of Review.
Given

the narrowness

of

any modification

to

the

at-will

doctrine, if Broadbent's allegations, considered in the light most
favorable

to her, fail to establish a claim, the District

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

is

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c);

DuBois v. Grand Central, 872 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Utah App. 1994).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Summary judgment

is appropriate when no genuine

issue of

material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt Lake

County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993) (citing Sandy City v. Salt
6

Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 214 (Utah 1992)).
Summary judgment was appropriately entered on behalf of the
District

for

two

reasons.

First,

there

is

no

waiver

of

governmental immunity for the tort of wrongful discharge of an atwill employee.

Second, any claim based on a violation of the EEA

would also be barred by the Governmental Immunity Act.
simply

no

recognizable

waiver

of

immunity

in

There is

this

case;

consequently, Broadbent's complaint fails as a matter of law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS NO BASIS IN LAW OR FACT
BROADBENT'S CLAIM OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE.

FOR

A. It is undisputed Broadbent was an "at-will" employee of
the School District,
1.
As a provisional teacher, she could be fired for any
reason, or for no reason at all.
Broadbent

has

admitted

she

understood

her

employment

relationship with the School District, at the time she was notified
her contract would not be renewed, was as a provisional or "year by
year" teacher. As an "at-will" employee, she had no expectation of
continuing employment.

In fact, she could be fired at any time

prior to the end of her three year provisional term for any reason
or for no reason at all.
The general rule concerning personal employment contracts
is, in the absence of some further express or implied
stipulation as to the duration of the employment or of a
good consideration in addition to the services contracted
to be rendered, the contract is no more than an
indefinite general hiring which is terminable at the will
of either party... When an individual is hired for an
indefinite time, he has no right of action against his
employer for breach of the employment contract upon being
7

discharged.
Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1979).
Utah courts have been reluctant to recognize the sufficiency
of claims attempting to modify the at-will doctrine.
GTE Health Systems, Inc., 857 P.2d

974, 977

See Evans v.

(Utah App. 1993)

(holding "general assurances of an ongoing working relationship are
not sufficiently definite so as to rebut the at-will presumption");
Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 P.2d

331, 334-45

(Utah 1992)

(reasoning "although Hodgson may have subjectively believed that
her employment

could be

terminated

only after a warning,

the

standards of unilateral offer and acceptance require that Hodgson
reasonably believe the employment was other than at will, and this
standard has not been met"); and Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.,
771 P. 2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989) (recognizing a discharged employee
may rebut the presumption that an employment contract is at-will by
a

showing

that the parties

expressly or

impliedly

intended a

specified duration or agreed to terminate the relationship for
cause alone).
Broadbent has made no attempt in this case to raise a question
of fact regarding any express or implied terms which may have
modified her at-will status.1

Rather, she relies on the public

x

The presumption of at-will status can be rebutted by strong
evidence manifesting the employer communicated to the employee
sufficiently definite modifications to induce a belief that the
terms of employment are other than at-will. Sorenson v. KennecottUtah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah App. 1994); Kirberg
v. West One Bank, 872 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah App. 1994).
Broadbent
admits she was an at-will employee and offers no evidence of
modification.
8

policy limitation to the at-will doctrine to support her claim
against the District.
2.
The "public policy exception" is a narrowly confined
limitation on the at-will doctrine.
In Berube, three justices of the Utah Supreme Court in dictum
agreed

that

the

at-will

employment

doctrine

arising

from

an

indefinite-term employment contract is limited by a public policy
exception.

See 771 P.2d at 1042 (opinion of Durham, J., joined by

Stewart, J . ) ; 771 P.2d at 1051 (opinion of Zimmerman, J . ) .

The

lead opinion in Berube recognized that the term "public policy" is
a vague and elastic term in need of limitation so as not to provide
an arguable basis for a lawsuit every time an
employee is discharged.

indefinite-term

Id. at 1042.

Then, in Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P. 2d
483, 485 (Utah 1989), four members of the Utah Supreme Court stated
that at least some principles of public policy limit the unbridled
exercise of employer discretion in the discharge of an indefiniteterm employee. Caldwell cautioned that the public policy exception
could not be read so broadly as to impose a requirement of "good
cause" for the discharge of every indefinite-term employee.

Id. at

485 6c 485 n. 2.
The

"so-called

public

policy

exception

to

the

at-will

doctrine," Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 168 (Utah
1991) (opinion of Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result), seems
to be a recognized limitation in Utah courts.
however,

that

this

exception

applies

"only

It is very clear,
[to] those

public

policies that are 'clear' and 'substantial7 and arise from statutes
9

or constitutions."

Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P. 2d

949, 960 (Utah 1992),

(opinion of Zimmerman, J., quoting Justice

Durham in Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah 1992)).
Accord see Hodges, 811 P.2d at 166 (recognizing the public policy
exception may be applied to criminal statutory prohibitions which
"provide narrow and clear-cut definitions of a specific public
policy designed to protect both society at large and specific
individuals from antisocial acts").
Thus, recognition of the public policy limitation is narrowly
confined.
3.
There is no basis
limitation in this case.
Broadbent

has

claimed,

for recognizing
in

very

the public policy

general

terms,

that

her

termination from the School District indirectly violated her right
to advocate for a handicapped child's statutory rights under the
Americans with Disabilities Act.

Such a convoluted claim does not

state a public policy violation.
In Larson v. Sysco Corp., 767 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah 1989) the
Court, applying Idaho law, addressed a claim that the manner of a
commissioned

salesman's

termination

did

not

comply

with

the

provision of the written employment contract governing notice prior
to termination.

The Court noted, "At bottom, Larson's defense to

his termination is nothing more than a challenge to his employer's
determination that his performance was poor."

Id.

The Court then

concluded:
[T]he public policy exception only protects employees who
refuse to commit unlawful acts, who perform important public
obligations, or who exercise certain legal rights or
10

privileges.
Id. at 559-560, citations omitted.
Other states have similarly refused to extend the public
policy exception to circumstances such as presented here.

For

example, the court in Haburiak v. Prudential Bache Securities,
Inc. , 759 F.Supp. 293 (W.D.N.C. 1991), after a careful review of
North Carolina's treatment of the exception, concluded:
[T]he public policy exception to the employment at-will
doctrine is limited to those instances in which an
employer affirmatively instructs an employee to violate
the law. Because Plaintiff has failed to introduce any
evidence that Defendant instructed him to violate the
law, summary judgment on this claim will be granted.
Id. at 298-301.
Significantly, the exception has never been applied to matters
of judgment, which is what is at issue here.2

See for example

Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 451 N.Y.S.2d 232 (N.Y.
1982)

(holding

summary

judgment

appropriate

because

dispute

ultimately leading to plaintiff's discharge was not one of his
blowing the whistle about false book entries, but rather involved
a matter of judgment as to appropriate accounting techniques).
Further, no exception

is recognized

allegedly violated is too general or broad.

if the public policy
In Bruffett v. Warner

Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910, 914 (3d Cir. 1982), the Third

2

As described in the Statement of Facts section of this brief,
there is a factual dispute over what was in the best interests of
the child, "J.B." -- Broadbent believed he should be identified as
handicapped; whereas Landeen believed his interests would best be
met otherwise. See Addendum B. Such a difference of opinion does
not meet the stringent "clear and substantial" standard required
for recognition of the public policy exception.
11

Circuit, applying Pennsylvania law, concluded that a complaint,
alleging that an aged employee working under an at-will contract
was terminated solely because of his age, did not state a cause of
action for violation of state public policy.

That court reasoned

that the state human rights act declaring public policy against age
discrimination did not create a specific, independent common-law
cause of action for unlawful discharge.
Similarly,

the

Colorado

Court

Id.

of

Appeals,

in

Lampe

v.

Presbyterian Med. Center, 590 P.2d 513, 514-15 (Colo. App. 1978)
declined to extend Colorado tort law to cover plaintiff's claim the
public

policy

exception

applied

to

her

at-will

employment.

Specifically, Lampe alleged that she was discharged for acting in
accordance with Colorado's general statement of policy contained in
statutes which give the state Nursing Board authority to discipline
nurses who negligently or willfully act in a manner inconsistent
with the health or safety of persons under their care.

She argued

that the public policy enunciated in these statutes imposed on her
a responsibility to take certain actions, and that her job was
terminated because she attempted to fulfill that responsibility.
Lampe characterized her termination as "retaliatory."

Id. at 515.

The court held:
Given the general language used in the statute relied on
in this case, we cannot impute to the General Assembly an
intent to modify the contractual relationships between
hospitals and their employees in such situations.
Neither can we impute an intent to create a claim for
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relief based
action.

on

a mere

possibility

of

disciplinary

Id. at 515-516.
Based on the foregoing, there is insufficient basis in this
case

to

doctrine.

recognize

a

public

policy

exception

to

the

at-will

As Associate Chief Justice Howe wrote in his concurring

opinion in Peterson;
I write to underscore that the public policy exception is
to be applied narrowly and only when there exists a
violation of a clear and substantial public policy.
Accordingly, I do not contemplate that the exception will
be frequently invoked or that it should be of concern to
employers who are guided by honesty in their employment
relations.
832 P.2d at 1285.

There is no evidence before this Court that the

School District acted dishonestly.

There is simply no clear and

substantial basis in public policy to intervene in the District's
right to replace an insubordinate teacher.
B. Even if there were a sufficient basis, a claim premised on
the public policy exception to wrongful discharge sounds in tort,
not contract.
In the seminal case of Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280,
1281 (Utah 1992), the Court held that the public policy exception
may apply to allegations

that an employee was terminated

refusing to commit an unlawful act.

for

The question of whether this

exception sounded in tort or contract was certified by the United
States District Court for the District of Utah.3
3

The Supreme Court

The same question was certified and answered by the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma in Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 28 (Okla.
1989), in which that court held: "An employer's termination of an
at-will employee in contravention of a clear mandate of public
policy is a tortious breach of contractual obligations." In fact,
the majority of courts addressing the question have reached a
13

answered that the exception sounds in tort.
DuBois v. Grand Central, 872 P.2d
(holding

an

implied

covenant

of

Id. at 1285.4

1073, 1078
good

faith

Accord

(Utah App. 1994)
cannot

change

an

indefinite-term, at-will employment contract into a contract that
requires an employer to have good cause to justify a discharge);
Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991)
(holding former employee's termination by former employer did not
constitute breach of contract where there was no evidence that
employment

relationship

was

other

than

at-will);

Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 594 F.Supp. 791, 829

Amos

v.

(D. Utah

1984), rev'd on other grounds, 483 U.S. 327, 97 L.Ed.2d 273, 107
S.Ct. 2862

(1985)

(holding at-will employee's claim of wrongful

discharge not actionable under contract).
Thus, even if this Court were to recognize a basis for the
similar conclusion. "Of those courts recognizing the public policy
exception to the at-will doctrine, the overwhelming majority adopt
the tort theory."
Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1284, 1284 & n. 5,
citations omitted.
4

Justice Zimmerman wrote a lengthy concurring and dissenting
opinion in the Peterson case in which he recommended a two-layered
course of recovery, preferring contract recovery to tort.
He
wrote, "I see contract damages as sufficient to make an employee
whole in the ordinary case, but would permit the discharged
employee to seek any of the traditional tort remedies if he or she
could prove an independent tort." 832 P.2d at 1288. Nearly seven
months later, Justice Zimmerman wrote the lead opinion in the
Retherford case in which he noted that "the tort of discharge in
violation of public policy differs in both scope and sanction from
any contractual provision that might limit an employer's power to
discharge an employee for other than just cause." 844 P.2d at 959.
Zimmerman added, "Both respect for precedent and sound public
policy compel the conclusion that the tort of discharge in
violation of public policy should be available to all employees
regardless of their contractual status." Id. at 959-960. It would
therefore seem that the Utah Supreme Court is now in agreement that
discharge in violation of public policy sounds in tort.
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public policy exception, since it sounds in tort, not contract,
there is no waiver of immunity.
POINT II
BROADBENT CANNOT RECOVER BASED ON ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF THE EDUCATOR EVALUATION ACT.
A. There is no basis, either stated or implied, to assume the
Legislature intended the EEA to provide a private cause of action.
The Educator Evaluation Act, at least implicitly, was drafted
to protect school authorities from claims of negligence in hiring
or retaining incompetent or otherwise unsuitable teachers.

See

"Collateral References," Utah Code Ann. § 53A-10-101 (1992).

The

stated statutory purpose is:

"The desired purposes of evaluation

are to allow the educator and the school district to promote the
professional

growth of the teacher, to identify and encourage

teacher behaviors which contribute to student progress, to identify
teachers according to their abilities, and to improve the education
system."

Id.

Conspicuously absent

is language requiring the

district to attempt to remediate a provisional educator who is
considered insubordinate.

Also absent is language granting an

educator the right to sue for wrongful discharge or breach of
contract should the school district determine remediation would not
be useful.
B. Generally, the rights recognized for wrongful discharge of
an at-will employee are severely limited; specifically, no
cognizable claim has been stated by Broadbent.
It is generally held that school boards need not have "good
cause"

to terminate provisional

teachers.

See Moore v. Utah

Technical College, 727 P. 2d 634, 637 (Utah 1986) (recognizing there
15

is no property interest in continued employment if educator is nontenured) ; accord Elwell v. Bd. of Educ. of Park City, 626 P. 2d 460,
463 (Utah 1981) (holding there is no due process violation based on
board's failure to renew provisional employee's contract); see
also, Toshiba American, Inc. v. Simmons, 480 N.Y.S.2d 28, 32 (N.Y.
1984); Wesockes v. Powers Sch. Dist. No. 31, 646 P.2d 68, 70 (Or.
App. 1982); Maddox v. Clackamas Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 25, 626 P.2d
924, 926 (Or. App. 1981)
While it may be a harsh result in some cases, there are rare
exceptions to this general rule.

School boards are overwhelmingly

supported in their determinations not to renew provisional teaching
contracts.

See for example Abbott v. Bd. of Educ. of Nebo Sch.

Dist. , 558 P. 2d 1307, 1308 (Utah 1976) .

Of course, provisional

teachers are allowed to quit without cause.

Absent bilateral

contractual modifications not present or argued here, the freedom
to cancel provisional status is not generally abridged.
This result has even been reached in instances where the
educator is not probationary, as in Piacitelli v. Southern Utah
State College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1066-67 (Utah 1981).

In Piacitelli,

the Court held that so long as the substantial interests which a
college's termination procedures are designed to safeguard are in
fact satisfied and protected, the college's failure to conform to
every technical detail of the procedures is not actionable.
Similarly, there is no basis for Broadbent's claim that technical
adherence to the provisions of the EEA are actionable.

She was an

at-will employee with no expectation of continued employment.
16

The

existence of the E^A adds nothing to her status.
C. Even if there were violations of the provisions of the
EEA, there is no basis for a private cause of action.
Moreover, even if there were a clear statutory violation of
the provisions of the Educator Evaluation Act, Broadbent cannot
base an independent cause of action on such a violation.

In a case

which is directly applicable to the present case, Schofield v.
Richland Cty. Sch. Dist., 447 S.E.2d 189 (S.C. 1994), attached as
Addendum B, the Supreme Court of South Carolina addressed a claim
by a provisional teacher that the trial judge erred in applying a
section of the South Carolina Code which is very similar to Utah's.
Specifically, the trial judge ruled that S.C. Code Ann. § 59-26-40
(1990) did not require the school district to provide remedial
procedures for performance concerns prior to its refusal to rehire
the teacher.

Id. at 191.

The court noted that the teacher's

contract was not renewed based on performance concerns that arose
independently of any evaluation process.

Id.

Therefore, "the

trial judge properly held that section 59-26-40 does not mandate
renewal of a provisional contract even when a teacher has performed
adequately."
The

Id.5

Schofield

case

applies

to

the

present

facts.

The

disagreement over the status of J.B. and Broadbent's refusal to

interestingly, the South Carolina Supreme Court also rejected
the teacher's argument that it was against public policy to allow
the school district to refuse to renew a provisional contract based
on "perceived teaching deficiencies when no remedial action had
been afforded." 447 S.E.2d at 191. The court concluded that the
"school district's actions were not inconsistent the public policy
of this state." Id. at 192.
17

follow

her

supervisor's

direction

arose

independently

of

evaluations undertaken in the ordinary course of her term as a
provisional teacher.

Thus, even if her evaluations were adequate

and even if she weren't offered remediation, there can be no basis
for recovery.
A similar result was reached in Leonard v. Converse Cty. Sch.
Dist. No. 2, 788 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Wyo. 1990) in which that court
held:
In this case, the School District argues that it adopted
the evaluation policy primarily for use in performing
operational and supervisory duties and not for the
primary purpose of protecting initial contract teachers.
We agree. The evaluation rules did not protect initial
contract teachers from dismissal because, as teachers
without tenure, they could be dismissed even after
receiving favorable evaluations. In addition, the policy
stated that the primary purpose for teacher supervision
and evaluation was to develop staff and improve teaching.
We hold that, even if the evaluation rules had a
secondary purpose relating to termination or retention,
they did not give initial contract teachers a claim to,
entitlement
to,
or
reasonable
expectation
of
reemployment.
The School District's failure to follow
the evaluation requirements did not result in an
arbitrary and capricious decision to terminate Leonard's
employment.
Id. at 1121, citations omitted, emphasis added.

In accord Roberts

v. Lincoln Ctv. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 676 P.2d 577, 581 (Wyo. 1984)
(upholding a school district's decision to terminate the employment
of an initial

contract

teacher

despite

its failure

to

follow

required evaluation procedures); Hopp v. Oroville Sch. Dist. No.
410, 639 P.2d 872, 876 (Wash. App. 1982) (holding that even though
the applicable statute referred to both certified and provisional
teachers, the probationary provisions and the valuative criteria
did not apply to plaintiff, a provisional
18

teacher who had no

constitutional

"property" interest in public employment).

See

generally, O'ROURKE, M., Nonrenewal of Teacher Contracts: A Primer
on South Dakota

Statutory

and Case Law, 39 So.Dak.L.Rev.
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(1994) .
Because there is no express or implied private right of action
under the EEA,6 summary judgment on behalf of the School District
was properly entered.
P. The Educator Evaluation Act does not alter the contractual
relationship between the parties and does not support a contract
based claim.
As a matter of contract between the parties, provisional
employees of the School District have no right or expectation of
continued employment beyond the current school year in which they
are

employed.

See

Cache

County

6

School

Board's

Policies

and

Broadbent's arguments on this point are unavailing. In fact,
the only Utah case she cites in support of her theory that she
should be entitled to civil damages for "violations" of the EEA is
Griffin v. Memmott, 814 P.2d 601 (Utah App. 1991) where this court
refused to recognize a private right of action was created by a
federal statute. The Griffin court noted:
The
following
four
factors
are
informative
in
ascertaining [the] intent [of Congress]: (1) whether the
plaintiff is a member of a class for whose special
benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether Congress
intended to create or deny a private remedy; (3) whether
a private remedy would be consistent with the statute's
underlying purposes; and (4) whether the cause of action
traditionally is relegated to state law.
Id. at 602, citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080,
2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). Applying these factors, the Griffin
court concluded that the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976 (FLPMA) did not expressly create a right of action in private
parties for non-compliance with its requirements. Id. Further,
such a right would be "out of harmony with the intended purpose and
effect" of the statute. Id. at 602-603. The court concluded that
"FLPMA's only conceivable benefit is to the BLM, and its purpose is
to serve the BLM's administrative objectives, not those of private
claimants," Id. at 603, and therefore, there was no basis for a
private cause of action, Id. at 604.
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Procedures, sections III.7.6.b. and III.10.9.a.l., R. 43 - 57;
Abbott v. Bd. of Educ. of Nebo Sch. Dist., 558 P.2d 1307 (Utah
1976) .
The language of the EEA does nothing to vary the contractual
expectations, nor does the EEA create or imply the existence of an
additional contract.
1991),

the

In Prows v. State of Utah, 822 P. 2d 764 (Utah

plaintiffs

sued

for breach

assessments.

The Court disposed of the breach of contract claim,

contract.

a

statutory

obligation

pay

statutorily

on

alleged

that

to

contract, based

defendants'

ruling

failure

of

does

not

give

required

rise

to

a

The Court held:

It is well recognized that the performance of a duty
imposed by law is insufficient consideration to support
a contract.
Therefore, we conclude that statutorily
mandated
assessment
payments
do
not
constitute
consideration
sufficient
to
support
a
contract.
Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim fails as a matter of
law.
822 P.2d at 768, citations omitted.
Likewise, alleged obligations arising under the EEA "do not
constitute consideration sufficient to support a contract."

The

existence of the EEA does not give rise to new contractual rights
and

obligations

between

the

parties,

outside

the

negotiated

policies and procedures which form part of the contract between
them.

The express contract between the parties, as contained in

the School District's policies and procedures, makes it clear that
Broadbent, as a provisional teacher, had no right to or expectation
of continued employment beyond the 1991-92 school year, and the
School District was free to non-renew her contract at will.
20

The fact that Broadbent cannot support a contract theory of
recovery against the District is fatal to her claims since they are
barred by the Governmental Immunity Act.
POINT III
EVEN IF THERE WERE A BASIS FOR A PRIVATE CAUSE
OF ACTION, BROADBENT'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY
THE IMMUNITY PROVISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT.
A. There is no waiver of governmental immunity for the tort
of wrongful discharge.
It is uncontested by either party that the School District is
a governmental entity as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(3),
(7) (1993).

It is also uncontested that the School District was

performing a governmental function as defined in Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-2(4) (a)# (b) (1993).

Accordingly, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-

3(1) (1993), providing that all governmental entities are immune
from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a
governmental

function, applies to this case.

Thus,

absent a

specific waiver, the School District is immune.
Broadbent asks that this Court reverse the prior decisions of
the Utah Supreme Court and determine that her wrongful discharge
claim lies in contract.

She makes this plea based on the waiver of

immunity for contractual obligations found in section 63-30-5 of
the immunity act.

However, even if this Court were to entertain

the argument that it can overturn the precedent of the Utah Supreme
Court, her request does not satisfy Menzies' careful requirements
for overruling prior case law.

State v. Menzies, 879 P. 2d 393, 395

& n. 3 (Utah 1994), cited in White v. Deseelhorst. 879 P.2d 1371,
21

1373 (Utah 1994).
Furthermore, Broadbent has not alleged malice or fraud for
which a waiver would be recognized under section 63-30-4(4) .

She

has not claimed a dangerous or defective condition for which a
waiver of immunity would be recognized under sections 63-30-8 and
9.

And she has not claimed negligence for which a waiver could be

recognized under section 63-30-10.
The ineluctable result is there is no basis upon which to
recognize a waiver of immunity for the intentional tort of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy.
B. Nor is there a waiver for claims brought pursuant to the
Educator Evaluation Act.
Similarly, since there is no basis in contract to recover
under

the

EEA,

even

if

there

were

an

alternative

theory

recovery,7 Broadbent's claims against the District fail.
the District

is

immunized

from

suit by

the general

Again,

grant

immunity contained in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1) (1993).

of

of

Ledfors

v. Emery Cty. Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993) . Because
there are no applicable waivers to immunity recognized

for an

alleged violation of the EEA, the District's "blanket immunity"
remains intact.

Id.

Thus, Broadbent's claims based on a private right of action
for

an

alleged

violation

of

the

provisions

of

the

Educator

Evaluation Act also fail as a matter of law.
7

The breach of a noncontractual statutory duty, if any action
lies, is tortious in character. DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663
P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983); Julesburg Sch. Dist. No. RE-1, Etc. v.
Ebke, 562 P.2d 419, 421 (Colo. 1977).
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CONCLUSION
Summary judgment was appropriate in this case.

Broadbent's

claim under the public policy exception to the employment at-will
doctrine, even if supportable, is barred as an intentional tort
claim against a governmental entity performing a governmental
function. Additionally, because the EEA includes no provisions for
private causes of action, provides no claim of relief and provides
no additional or modifying contractual rights, Broadbent has failed
to state a basis for recovery for which immunity has been waived.
Consequently, the trial court's order in favor of defendant and
against plaintiff should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _/^_?f day of April, 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

ELIZABETH KING
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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875 East 5180 South
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

63-29-1

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

CHAPTER 29
UTAH STATE FIRE PREVENTION LAW
(Repealed in part by Laws 1985, ch. 40, § 5; 1991, ch. 220, § 25; renumbered by L.
1991, ch. 220, §§ 1 to 22.)

63-29-1 to 63-29-27. Renumbered.
Renumbered. — Laws 1991, ch. 220 renumbered most of the sections in this chapter, the
Utah State Fire Prevention Law, as present
Chapter 27 of this title, effective April 29,
1991. Section 25 of that act repealed former
§ 63-29-9, as last amended by L. 1965, ch. 137,
§ 4; § 63-29-11, as enacted by L. 1963, ch. 156,
§ 11; § 63-29-12, as enacted by L. 1965, ch.
137, § 7; §§ 63-29-13 and 63-29-15, as enacted
by L. 1969, ch. 204, §§ 1,3; and § 63-29-25 and

§ 63-29-26, as enacted by L. 1971, ch. 157,
§§ 6, 7. Section 63-29-8, as amended by L.
1985, ch. 236, § 4, was repealed by L. 1985, ch.
40, § 5.
Laws 1991, ch. 157, § 2 amended former
§ 63-29-9 and Laws 1991, ch. 202, § 6
amended former § 63-29-12, but the amendments have not been given effect because of the
repeal of those sections.

CHAPTER 29a
LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS BOARD
(Renumbered by Laws 1993, ch. 234, §§ 324 to 338)

63-29a-101 to 63-29a-112. Renumbered.
Renumbered. — Laws 1993, ch. 234,
§§ 324 to 338 renumber §§ 63-29a-101 to
63-29a-112, regulating the use of liquefied pe-

troleum gas, as §§ 53-7-302 to 53-7-316, effective July 1, 1993.

CHAPTER 30
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
Section
63-30-2.
63-30-3.
63-30-4.

63-30-5.
63-30-7.
63-30-8.

Definitions.
Immunity of governmental entities from suit.
Act provisions not construed as
admission or denial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity — Exclusive remedy
— Joinder of employee —
Limitations on personal liability.
Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations.
Repealed.
Waiver of immunity for injury
caused by defective, unsafe,
or dangerous condition of
highways, bridges, or other
structures.

Section
63-30-9.

63-30-10.

63-30-10.5.
63-30-10.6.
63-30-U.

336

Waiver of immunity for injury
from dangerous or defective
public building, structure, or
other public improvement —
Exception.
Waiver of immunity for injury
caused by negligent act or
omission of employee — Exceptions.
Waiver of immunity for taking
private property without
compensation.
Attorneys' fees for records requests.
Claim for injury — Notice —
Contents — Service — Legal
disability.

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
Section
63-30-18
63-30-22

63-30-28.

63-30-33

Section
Compromise and settlement of
actions
Exemplary or punitive damages
prohibited — Governmental
entity exempt from execution, attachment, or garnishment
Liability insurance — Purchase
of insurance or self-insurance
by governmental entity authorized — Establishment of
trust accounts for self-insurance
Liability insurance — Insurance for employees authorized — No right to mdemni-

63-30-34

63-30-35

63-30-36

63-30-2

fication or contribution from
governmental agency
Limitation
of
judgments
against governmental entity
or employee — Insurance coverage exception
Expenses of attorney general,
general counsel for state judiciary, and general counsel for
the Legislature in representing the state, its branches,
members, or employees
Defending government employee — Request — Cooperation — Payment of judgment

63-30-1. Short title.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
m Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990 Utah L Rev 129
Journal of Energy, Natural Resources
and Environmental Law. — Government Liability for Seismic Hazards in Utah, 11 J Energy, Nat Resources & Envtl L 69 (1990)
A.L.R. — Construction and application of
Federal Tort Claims Act provision excepting
from coverage claims arising out of interfer-

ence with contract rights (28 USCS § 2680(h)),
92 A L R Fed 186
Application of collateral source rule m actions under Federal Tort Claims Act (28 USCS
§ 2674), 104 A.L R Fed 492
Appealability, under collateral order doctrine, of order denying qualified immunity in
42 USCS § 1983 or Bivens action for damages
where claim for equitable relief is also pending
— post-Harlow cases, 105 A L R Fed 851

63-30-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages
against a governmental entity or against an employee.
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, employees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of
an advisory body, officers and employees in accordance with Section
62A-4-603, student teachers certificated in accordance with Section
53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing services
to members of the public in the course of an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program, volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent contractor.
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position receives compensation.
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions as defined in this chapter.
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is char337
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acterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential
to or not essential to a government or governmental fiinction, or
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons.
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity.
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate,
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent.
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property
damage.
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district,
public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement or
taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation.
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, estate, or interest in real or personal property.
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college,
university, or other instrumentality of the state.
History; L. 1965, ch. 139, I 2; 1973, ch.
103, § 2; 1978, ch. 27, § 1; 1981, ch. 116, § 1;
1983, ch. 129, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 2; 1987 (1st
S.S.), ch. 4, § 1; 1988, ch. 2, § 338; 1991, ch.
248, § 6.

Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "officers and employees in accordance with Section
62A-4-603" near the middle of Subsection
(2)(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
"State."
The University of Utah is an arm of the state
for Eleventh Amendment immunity purposes.

Pharmaceutical & Diagnostic Servs., Inc. v.
University of Utah, 801 F. Supp. 508 (D. Utah
1990).

63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit.
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in
either public or private facilities.
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following state medical
programs and services performed at a state-owned university hospital are
unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state and
are considered to be governmental functions:
(i) care of a patient referred by another hospital or physician because of the high risk nature of the patient's medical condition;
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah only at a stateowned university hospital or provided in Utah only by physicians
employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope of their
employment;
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive appropriate medical care
or treatment at another medical facility in Utah; and
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(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a state-owned university hospital or by physicians employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope of their employment that a court finds is
unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state,
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds the limits established in
Section 63-30-34, the claimant may submit the excess claim to the Board
of Examiners and the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6.
(3) The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental
entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury
or damage resulting from those activities.
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center are immune from
suit for any injury which results from their joint intergovernmental functions
at a center created in Title 62A, Chapter 4.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3; 1978, ch. 27,
§ 2; 1981, ch. 116, § 2; 1984, ch. 33, § 1; 1985,
ch. 93, § 1; 1991, ch. 15, § 1; 1991, ch. 248,
§ 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment by ch. 15, effective April 29, 1991, added
Subsection (2) and added Subsection designations (1) and (3).

The 1991 amendment by ch. 248, effective
April 29, 1991, added the subsection designations and added present Subsection (4).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989).

ANALYSIS

Building code.
Construction and application.
Creek drainage system.
Equitable claims.
Flood control.
Governmental function.
Prisoners.
Schools and school districts.
Subdivision plan approval.
Takings clause claim.
Water storage tank.

Creek drainage system.
Construction, operation, and maintenance of
a creek drainage system was a governmental
function. Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989).

Building code.
A city municipal corporation, its agents, and
its architectural consultant were immune from
suit by plaintiffs who had purchased and renovated a hotel in the city and in order to enjoy
certain tax advantages wanted to obtain an occupancy permit, but the city's hired architectural firm reported code violations and the city
denied the occupancy permit. D.C.A. Dev.
Corp. v. Ogden City Mun. Corp., 965 F.2d 827
(10th Cir. 1992).
Construction and application.
The 1984 amendment to this section could
not be applied retroactively to bar a valid
cause of action that had already arisen when
the amendment went into effect. Irvine v. Salt
Lake County, 785 P.2d 411 (Utah 1989); Rocky

Equitable claims.
In accord with bound volume. See Bennett v.
Bow Valley Dev. Corp., 797 P.2d 419 (Utah
1990); Shoreline Dev., Inc. v. Utah County, 190
Utah Adv. Rep. 56 (Ct. App. 1992).
Flood control.
The grant of immunity for flood control activities mentioned in the second paragraph is
subject to the exception mentioned in the first
paragraph. Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794
P.2d 838 (Utah 1990); Provo City Corp. v. State
ex rel. Dep't of Transp., 795 P.2d 1120 (Utah
1990).
In amending this section in 1984, the Legislature intended to specify flood control activities as governmental functions, thus bringing
those activities within the Governmental Immunity Act. Thus, the second paragraph of this
section is subject to the waiver provisions
found in the Governmental Immunity Act.
Provo City Corp. v. State ex rel. Dep't of
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Transp, 795 P 2d 1120 (Utah 1990), Hambhn
v City of Clearfield, 795 P2d 1133 (Utah
1990)
Governmental function.
The issuance of permits and certificates of
occupancy and the administering of building
inspections as identified by the legislature m
k 63-30-10 are "core" governmental functions,
so that a county's negligent acts or omissions
relating to those functions are expressly excepted from waiver of immunity DeBry v Salt
Lake County, 188 Utah Adv Rep 55 (Ct App
1992)

ble liability for damages arising from its negligence in the resurfacing of a school parking lot,
which resulted in surface water runoff on an
adjoining landowner's property Williams v
Carbon County Bd of Educ, 780 P 2d 816
(Utah 1989)

Prisoners.
Bailiffs action against state for gunshot
wound inflicted by a prisoner was properly dismissed, because either (1) the prisoner had
totally escaped the control of the officers escorting him and was thus acting on his own so
the officers were not responsible for him, or (2)
he was still under the control of the officers, in
which case the officers would be immune from
suit under the statute Kirk v State, 784 P 2d
1255 (Utah Ct App 1989)
Schools and school districts.
School, in pumping water out of its basement, was not engaged as a governmental entity in the "management of flood waters" so as
to be immune from suit Branam v Provo
School Dist, 780 P 2d 810 (Utah 1989)
School district was not shielded from possi-

Takings clause claim.
Governmental immunity does not preclude
the bringing of a suit under Amendment V of
the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution in a proper
case Bennett v Bow Valley Dev Corp , 797
P 2d 419 (Utah 1990)

Subdivision plan approval.
The inspection and acceptance of subdivision
improvements are governmental functions for
which immunity has not been waived Bennett
v Bow Valley Dev Corp , 797 P.2d 419 (Utah
1990)

Water storage tank.
Where owners of residential property alleged
that a city's water storage tanks leaked water
into their residential subdivision, causing or
adding to landslide problems that obstructed
the free use of their property, the court, on appeal, held that the maintenance of a water
storage tank is not uniquely governmental or
essential to the core of governmental activity
Bennett v Bow Valley Dev Corp , 797 P 2d
419 (Utah 1990)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Development
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990 Utah L Rev 129

63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity —
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Limitations on personal liability.
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, may
be construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility by or
for governmental entities or their employees.
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued
is granted, and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity
were a private person.
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by any waiver of
immunity in this chapter, nor may any provision of this chapter be construed as imposing strict liability or absolute liability.
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as adversely affecting any
immunity from suit that a governmental entity or employee may otherwise
assert under state or federal law.
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(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), an action under this chapter
against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury caused by an
act or omission that occurs during the performance of the employee's
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority is a
plaintiffs exclusive remedy.
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action or proceeding based upon the same subject matter against the employee or the
estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim,
unless:
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice; or
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the conditions set forth in
Subsection 63-30-36(3)(c).
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to
fraud or malice.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 4; 1978, ch. 27,
§ 3; 1983, ch. 129, § 3; 1991, ch. 76, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, added Subsections (l)(c) and (3)(b)(ii); added the Subsection
(a) and (b) designations in Subsection (1) and
added the subsection designations in Subsection (3); substituted "may" for "shall" in Sub-

sections (l)(a) and (2), substituted "Except as
provided in Subsection (b), an action under this
chapter" for "The remedy" and "a plaintiffs exclusive remedy" for "after the effective date of
this act, exclusive of in Subsection (3)(a); and
made minor stylistic and punctuation changes
throughout the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
occurred during the performance of his duties
as chairman but the complaint did not allege
that he acted with either fraud or malice.
Pharmaceutical & Diagnostic Servs., Inc. v.
University of Utah, 801 F. Supp. 508 (D. Utah
1990).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Official sued in representative capacity.
Personal liability.
—Applicability of section.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
This section does not violate the open courts
provision, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 11. DeBry
v. Salt Lake County, 188 Utah Adv. Rep. 55
(Ct. App. 1992).
Official sued in representative capacity.
Claim against chairman of the University of
Utah's Department of Radiology in his individual capacity was dismissed since there was little doubt that his "acts or omissions," if any,

Personal liability.
—Applicability of section.
Asserted acts of sex discrimination and harassment against a former county employee
did not amount to "fraud or malice" within the
meaning of Subsections (3) and (4) of this section. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 735 F. Supp.
381 (D. Utah 1990).
Cited in Naugle v. Witney, 755 F. Supp.
1504 (D. Utah 1990).
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63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any
contractual obligation. Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations
shall not be subject to the requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12,
63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the Division of Water Resources is not
liable for failure to deliver water from a reservoir or associated facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear River Development Act, if the failure to
deliver the contractual amount of water is due to drought, other natural
condition, or safety condition that causes a deficiency in the amount of available water.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 5; 1975, ch.
189, § 1; 1978, ch. 27, § 4; 1983, ch. 129, § 4;
1985, ch. 82, § 1; 1991, ch. 251, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-

ment, effective April 29, 1991, designated the
existing provisions as Subsection (1) and added
Subsection (2).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v.
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 141 (Utah 1990).

63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions involving property.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Scope of section.
This section waives immunity only for actions to recover property, quiet title, clear title,
or resolve disputes over mortgages or liens
held by a governmental entity; a claim alleg-

63-30-7.

ing damage or destruction of private property
by a governmental entity does not fall within
the grant of immunity in this section. Hansen
v . Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990).

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1991, ch. 76, § 10 repeals
§ 63-30-7, as last amended by Laws 1990, ch.
204, § 1, waiving immunity for injury from

negligent operation of motor vehicles, with exceptions, effective April 29, 1991.

63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways,
bridges, or other structures.
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waiver set
forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge,
viaduct, or other structure located on them.
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History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 8; 1991, ch. 76,
§ 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, added "Unless

63-30-10

the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waiver set forth in Section
63-30-10," and made several stylistic changes,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Duty to maintain.
Settled law governing liability for unsafe
street and sidewalk conditions warranted a reversal of a grant of summary judgment on the
grounds that a city did not owe plaintiff a duty

to maintain its sidewalk in a reasonably safe
condition; the city did have a duty to maintain
physical facilities Trapp v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 190 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (1992).

63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or
defective public building, structure, or other
public improvement — Exception.
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waiver set
forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for any injury caused from a dangerous or defective condition of any
public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 9; 1991, ch. 76,
§ 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, added "Unless
the injury arises out of one or more of the ex-

ceptions to waiver set forth in Section
63-30-10," and made a minor punctuation
change and deleted the former second sentence, which read: "Immunity is not waived for
latent defective conditions."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989).

63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of
civil rights;
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order, or similar authorization;
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or
negligent inspection;
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause;
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent
or intentional;
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(7) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations,
mob violence, and civil disturbances;
(8) or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city
jail, or other place of legal confinement;
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any
condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining operation, or any activity authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for
the clearing of fog;
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters;
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems;
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14;
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway,
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct,
or other structure located on them;
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement; or
(18) the activities of:
(a) providing emergency medical assistance;
(b) fighting fire;
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes;
(d) emergency evacuations; or
(e) intervening during dam emergencies.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch.
194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1;
1989, ch. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3; 1989,
ch. 268, § 29; 1990, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch.
319, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 76, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment by ch 15 effective July 1^ 1990, deleted
the subsection designation (1) from the beginmng of he section redesignated former Subsections (l)(a) to (1X1) as Subsections (1) to (13)
and made related changes, and deleted former
Subsection (2), waiving immunity from suit for
violation of Fourth Amendment rights and
making the provisions of Chapter 16 of Title 78
the exclusive remedy for injuries caused by
6uch violations.
The 1990 amendment by ch. 319, effective
July 1, 1990, added Subsection (13)(e) and
made a related stylistic change.
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,

1991, added Subsections (13) through (17) and
redesignated former Subsection (13) as present
Subsection (18), inserted "violation of before
"civil rights" in Subsection (2), deleted "of any
property" following "inspection" in Subsection
( 4 ) ) m a d e m i n o r gtyhstic changes in Subsect i o n s ( 6 ) a n d ( 1 2 ) ) ^ d r e w r o t e Subsection (11),
w h k h read. «
natural condltlon on state
l a n d s o r ag t h e r e g u l t of
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' Forestry."
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whlch
amended this section and §§ 63-30-4,
63-30-8, 63-30-9, 63-30-10.5, 63-30-11, 63-3033
» 63-30-34, and 63-30-36, provides m § 11
tnat
"Tms act has prospective effect only and
any changes to the law caused by this act do
not apply to any claims based upon injuries or
losses that occurred before the effective date of
this act [April 29, 1991]."
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CHAPTER 10
EDUCATOR EVALUATION
Section
53A-10-101.
53A-10-102.
53A-10-103.
53A-10-104.
53A-10-105.
53A-10-106.

Section
53A-10-107.
53A-10-108.

Legislative findings.
Definitions.
Establishment of educator evaluation program — Joint committee.
Frequency of evaluations.
Evaluation orientation.
Components of educator evaluation program — E valuator —
Notice — Criteria — Response.

53A-10-109.
53A-10-110.
53A-10-11L

Deficiencies — Remediation.
Consulting educator for provisional educator.
Final evaluation.
Review of evaluation — Time
limit on request
Additional compensation for
services.

53A-10-101. Legislative findings.
The Legislature recognizes that the quality of public education can be improved and enhanced by providing for systematic, fair, and competent evaluation of public educators and remediation of those whose performance is inadequate. The desired purposes of evaluation are to allow the educator and the
school district to promote the professional growth of the teacher, to identify
and encourage teacher behaviors which contribute to student progress, to
identify teachers according to their abilities, and to improve the education
system.
History: C. 1953, 53A-10-101, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. % § 135.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AXIL — Liability of school authorities for
hiring or retaining incompetent or otherwise
unsuitable teacher, 60 A X J U t h 260.

Validity and construction of statutes, ordinances, or regulations requiring competency
tests of schoolteachers, 64 AJLR.4th 642.

53A-10-102. Definitions.
As used in this chapter.
(1) "Career educator" means a certified employee entitled to rely upon
continued employment under the policies of a local school board.
(2) "Educator* means any individual, except the superintendent, employed by a school district who is required to hold a professional certificate issued by the State Board of Education. Educator does not include
individuals who work less than three hours per day or who are hired for
less than half of a school year.
(3) "Probationary educator" means any educator employed by a school
district who, under local school board policy, has been advised by the
district that his performance is inadequate.
(4) "Provisional educator" means any educator employed by a school
district who has not achieved status as a career educator within the
school district
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History: C. 1953, 53A-10-1Q2, enacted by
L. 1988, ch- 2, § 136; 1988, ch. 233, § 3; 1990,
ch. 78, § 25.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-

53A-10-106

ment, effective April 23, 1990, deleted "as an
educator" after performance* in Subsection
(3).

53A-10-103. Establishment of educator evaluation program — Joint committee.
(1) Each local school board shall develop an evaluation program in consultation with its educators through appointment of a joint committee.
(2) The joint committee shall be comprised of an equal number of classroom
teachers and administrators appointed by the board.
(3) A board may appoint members of the joint committee from a list of
nominees voted on by classroom teachers in a nomination election and from a
list of nominees voted on by the administrators in a nomination election.
(4) The evaluation program developed by the joint committee must comply
with the requirements of Section 53A-10-106.
History; C. 1953, 53A-10-1Q3, enacted by
L. 1988, ch, 2, § 137; 1990, ch. 78, § 26.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted
"classroom teachers and administrators appointed by the board" for "educator representa-

tives and board appointees" at the end of Subsection (2) and rewrote Subsection (3), which
read "The classroom teachers within the district shall vote on a list of nominees from
which the board selects the educator representatives."

53A-10-104. Frequency of evaluations.
A local school board shall provide for the evaluation of its provisional and
probationary educators at least twice each school year.
History: C. 1953, 53A-10-KK, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 2, { 138.

53A-10-1Q5. Evaluation orientation.
(1) The principal of each school shall orient all educators assigned to the
school concerning the school board's educator evaluation program, including
the purpose of the evaluations and the method used to evaluate.
(2) Evaluations may not occur prior to the orientation by the principal.
History: C. 1953, 53A-10.105, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 2, § 139.

53A-10-106. Components of educator evaluation program
— Evaluator — Notice — Criteria — Response.
Any educator evaluation program adopted by a local school board in consultation with a committee shall provide the following:
(1) unless otherwise provided in the adopted program, the principal,
the principal's designee, or the educator's immediate supervisor shall
perform the educator evaluation;
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(2) personal notice to the educator of the evaluation process at least 1*5
days prior to the first evaluation and receipt of a copy of the evaluation
instrument, if an instrument is to be used;
(3) a reasonable number of observation periods for any evaluation to
insure adequate opportunity for evaluation;
(4) the use of several types of evaluation and evidence, such as selfevaluation, student evaluation, peer evaluation, or systematic observations;
(5) that the educator may make a written response to all or any part of
the evaluation and that the response will be attached to the evaluation;
(6) a reliable and valid evaluation consistent with generally accepted
professional standards for personnel evaluation systems; and
(7) within 15 days after the completed evaluation process the evaluation in writing shall be discussed with the educator. Following any revisions made after the discussion, a copy of the evaluation shall be filed in
the educator's personnel file together with any related reports or documents. A copy of the evaluation and attachments shall be given to the
educator.
History: C. 1953, 53A-10-106, enacted by committee" in the introductory paragraph;
L. 1988, ch. 2, j 140; 1988, ch. 233, § 4; 1990, substituted "provided in the adopted program
ch- 78, i 27.
for "agreed by the committee established under
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- Section 53A-10-103" in Subsection (1); inserted
ment, effective April 23, 1990, deleted "devel- "and attachments" after "evaluation" in the
oped by the joint committee and** after "pro- final sentence in Subsection (7); and made
gram" and inserted "in consultation with a punctuation and stylistic changes.

53A-10-107. Deficiencies — Remediation.
(1) An educator whose performance is inadequate or in need of improvement shall be provided with a written document clearly identifying deficiencies, the available resources for improvement, and a recommended course of
action that will improve the educator's performance.
(2) The district shall provide the educator with reasonable assistance to
improve performance.
(3) An educator is responsible for improving performance by using the resources identified by the school district and demonstrating acceptable levels of
improvement in the designated areas of deficiencies.
History: C. 1953, 53A-10-107, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 2, $ 141; 1990, ch. 78, § 28.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted

"clearly identifying deficiencies" for "that
clearly identifies his deficiencies" in Subsection (1) and made related changes,

53A-10-108. Consulting educator for provisional educator.
(1) The principal or immediate supervisor of a provisional educator shall
assign a consulting educator to the provisional educator.
(2) If possible, the consulting educator shall be a career educator who performs substantially the same duties as the provisional educator and has at
least three years of educational experience.
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(3) The consulting educator shall assist the provisional educator to become
informed about the teaching profession and school system, but may not serve
as an evaluator of the provisional teacher.
History: C. 1953, 53A-10-108, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 2, § 142; 1990, ch. 78, § 29.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend*
ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted

* T W for "A" at the beginning of Subsection
(1) and inserted "or after "years" in Sobeection (2).

53A-10-109. Final evaluation.
(1) At least 60 days prior to the end of the contract school year, the principal, immediate supervisor, or appointed evaluator of an educator whose performance has been determined to be inadequate or in need of improvement,
shall complete all written evaluations and recommendations regarding the
educator evaluated during the contract school year.
(2) The final evaluation shall contain only data previously considered and
discussed with the individual educator as required in Section 53A-10-106.
(3) Nothing in this section prevents a school district from performing supplementary evaluation for good cause after the issuance of the final evaluation.
History: C. 1953, 53A-10-109, enacted by
L> 1988, ch. 2, i 143.

53A-10-110. Review of evaluation — Time limit on request
(1) An educator who is not satisfied with an evaluation has 30 days after
receiving the written evaluation to request a review of the evaluation.
(2) If a review is requested, the district superintendent or the superintendent's designee shall appoint a person, not an employee of the district, who
has expertise in teacher or personnel evaluation to review and make recommendations to the superintendent regarding the teacher's evaluation.
(3) Nothing in this section prevents the teacher and district superintendent
or the superintendent's designee from agreeing to another method of review.
History: C. 1953, 53A-1O-110, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 2, § 144; 1990, ch. 78, $ 30.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-

ment, effective April 23,1990, substituted "the
superintendent's designee" for "his designee"
in Subsections (2) and (3).

53A-10-111. Additional compensation for services.
The district may compensate a person employed as a consulting educator or
participant in the evaluation for those services, in addition to the person's
regular salary, if additional time is required in the evaluation process.
History: C. 1953, 53A-10-111, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 2, § 145; 1990, ch. 78, § 31.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-

ment, effective April 23,1990, substituted "the
person's" for "his."
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scheduled appearance in another court on that
date, but due to fact that there were no law or
motion days between time objection was filed
and trial date, objection was never heard, refusal to set aside default judgment entered
when appellants failed to appear on trial date
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
Time for appeal
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal
from a default judgment in a city court ran
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from the date of notice of entry of such judgment, rather than from the date of judgment,
Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d
124,288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank
& Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)).
C i t e d in U t a h Sand & Gravel

****** C o r P- v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965);
JPW
* E n t e r s » I n c - v Naef > 6 0 4 P 2 d ^ 6
< U t a h 1979>> K a t z v - ^eree, 7 3 2 P 2 d 9 2 <Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§

V . J 1 ~ 4 1 9 2 C 3 J . S . Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to liability against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d
1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
t r i a l f o r f l l i n g 0 f necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d
j.255
F

* i l u ? to * v e * o t i c e of application for derequured
f
^
^
f^Jf^f^
°nly
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers. — Judgment *=> 92 to 134.

f

ault

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
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forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.
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[1-3] While modern discover}' rules and
liberal pleading requirements virtually eliminate the need to report to an independent
action in the form of an equitable proceeding
for discovery, they do not totally displace the
traditional equitable junsdiction of the court
to i>sue appropriate orders for independent
<lM-o\ery when effecme discovery cannot
othenvi^e be obtained and the ends of justice
-jm'd. Shout/ r Lincoln Pulp S: Pa/n r
{'". oil A.lM 107<). 107* iMellNii
The
• ]>i '- •' -'i ('<'"• IMJ- ,«]].>v dw«>\t>r vim. ilj» liiij' - do nut pruude a median-o i ' L
>*• fif.nl ji a, Tm tV* Rftlih,
/'/ Jl* ^<
l ] j I"iO S E.2d r>2") 'UM^.t
< u.ii; i» L/.j i > « r - daiiii, tin* plain l.ii
g-uaiif «»t Rule .*Jlit» recognize- that an milependent di>cu\en action may be maintained
against a non-paiiy:
This rule does not preclude an independent
action against a person not a party for
production of documents and things and
permission to enter upon land.

[5] No other discovery procedure would
allow the Administrator to determine the
proper party to a third party complaint. Accordmgh. we hold that the trial judge, under
the equitable power of the court, properly
ordered Employer to allow Administrator to
inspect its premises. Accord Shorey. 511
A.2d at 1078 (trial court ha*- equity jurwhetion to order employee's pre-action inspection
of emp^er'* plant for purpn^v of n>u </tinn n ^Ivne which iniuit-d emp]<>\ee t»» dtT. .-r,
" ,T v.;i- r«*j'V« i *b <]•-.:»<' ' •
/</' /• H*** ()>t \ nuin hi(> 'K (n,j . 1<>:>
F K D. 40} (I> V.I 1'isOi (trial uidne uiu )H<]
t'n.pl«-\»i t<» wv n lnimvd empln\f - >} v<-'L' "! <>i pn.piin t<> ik^rriihi pi ,«i
part\ »\ po^ible third part\ action). Ba-rd
on our holding, we need not addre.^ Empl»»\er's remaining arguments.
AFFIRMED.
CHANDLER, FINNEY, TOAL and
MOORE, JJ., concur.

Rule 34(c), SCRCP.1 Accordingly, we reject
Employer's claim that the trial judge was
without authority to order discovery against
a non-party.
[4] We also reject Employer's claim that
the trial judge could not order discovery in
the absence of a civil action to which discovery was relevant. While a pure bill for discovery most often was brought to aid a party
in an action at law, the pendency of such an
action was not necessary. Shorey, 511 A.2d
at 1078.
The action in aid of which the discovery
is sought may be pending; but this is not
necessary. It is sufficient if the plaintiff in
the bill for a discovery shows that he has a
right to maintain or defend an action in
another court, and that he is about to sue
or is liable to be sued therein, although no
action is yet commenced; a discovery may
be needed to determine the proper parties
(footnotes omitted).
John Norton Pomeroy, Equity
dence. § 197(b) at 298 (1941).

Margaret SCHOFIELD, Appellant,
v.
RICHLAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, John Stevenson, Superintendent,
Richland County School District # 1,
Reverend William Bowman, William
Halligan, Leon Howard, Carol T. Lee,
Chris Lindsay, Darrell Jackson and Jasper Salmond, as members of the Board
of Richland County School District
Number 1, Respondents.
No. 24110.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Heard May 14, 1994.
Decided July 5, 1994.

Jurispru-

Provisional teacher brought suit against
school district which had previously em-

1. After this action was commenced, Rule 34(c)
was amended to include that "a person not a
partt ma\ be compelled to produce documents of

thmgs or submit to an inspection onK as provided in Rule 45 "
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ployed her for district's alleged breach of
statutory duty to provide remedial opportunities for perceived teaching deficiencies prior
to refusing to renew her provisional contract.
The Circuit Court, Richland County, Walter
J. Bristow, J., entered order dismissing complaint with prejudice, and teacher appealed.
The Supreme Court, Littlejohn, Acting Associate Justice, held that statute obligating
school districts to give provisional teachers
appropriate assistance to correct any deficiencies observed during statutorily required
evaluations did not require district to provide
such assistance to remedy performance concerns that arose independently of evaluation
process.
Affirmed.
1. Schools <s>147.26
Statute obligating school district to give
provisional teachers appropriate assistance to
correct any deficiencies observed during statutorily required evaluations did not require
district to provide such assistance to remedy
performance concerns that arose independently of evaluation process, nor did it prevent school district, prior to providing such
assistance, from deciding not to renew provisional teacher's contract based on such performance concerns. Code 1976, § 59-26-40.
2. Schools <3=>147.2(1)
Statute providing that provisional teacher wTho has performed adequately is eligible
for renewal of contract did not mandate that
provisional teacher's contract be renewed,
even assuming that teacher had performed
adequately. Code 1976, § 59-26-40.
3. Appeal and Error 0 1 6 9
Issue not raised to or ruled upon by trial
judge is not properly before Supreme Court
on appeal.
4. Schools <2»147.26
School district's decision not to renew
provisional teacher's contract based on perceived teaching deficiencies was not against
public policy, though no remedial procedures
were provided to teacher to assist her in
remedying perceived deficiencies prior to
school district's decision not to renew; school
district's performance concerns arose inde-

pendently of evaluation process, and it was
only in connection with evaluation process
that such remedial procedures were statutorily required. Code 1976, § 59-26-40.
William T. Toal, of Johnson, Toal & Battiste, Columbia, for appellant.
Kenneth L. Childs, M. Jane Turner, and
Andrea E. White, of Childs & Duff, Columbia, for respondents.
LITTLEJOHN, Acting Associate Justice.
Margaret Schofield (Teacher) brought this
action alleging that Richland County School
District (School District) breached its duty to
provide remedial opportunities for perceived
teaching deficiencies before refusing to renew her provisional contract. Teacher
claimed damages, costs, and reinstatement
The trial judge, in a non-jury term, dismissed
the complaint with prejudice on the ground
that the School District may refuse to renew
the contract of a provisional teacher on the
basis of performance concerns that arise independent of the statutory evaluation and
remediation procedures. Teacher appealed.
We affirm.
I. Facts
The School District hired Teacher for the
1990-91 school year under a provisional contract in accordance with S.C.Code Ann. § 5926-40 (1990). At the beginning of her term,
Teacher was given an orientation to the
teacher evaluation process and a copy of the
evaluation instrument, the Assessments of
Performance in Teaching Test (APT). During three class instructions, Teacher wTas
evaluated under the APT and received a
passing score on each of these evaluations.
During the school year, Teacher's supervisors developed concerns about her discipline
and control in the classroom, failure to provide planned, appropriate instruction, and
uncooperative behavior. Specifically, her supervisors noted an inordinate amount of
noise often could be heard from her classroom, her class had been playing basketball
during required instructional times, several
parents had complained about her behavior,
and the teachers on her teaching team had
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stated that she either failed to contribute or
missed team meetings.
After a formal observation of Teacher's
class in March, her principal informed her
that she did not intend to recommend Teacher for reassignment to that school. Thereafter, the District Superintendent notified
Teacher that her employment would n~t be
continued beyond the conclusion of the 199091 school year because of "concerns with her
classroom management and quality of instruction." This action followed.
II. Discussion
[1] Teacher alleges that the trial judge
erred in holding that section 59-26-40 did
not require the School District to provide
remedial procedures for all performance concerns prior to its refusal to rehire her. We
disagree.
Section 59-26-40 provides:
A person who receives a teaching certificate as provided in § 59-26-30 may be
employed by any school district under a
nonrenewable provisional contract
Each school district shall use the evaluation instrument developed in accordance
with § 59-26-30 to observe all provisional
teachers at least three times. The results
of the observations must be compiled to
constitute an evaluation and must be provided to the teacher in writing. Each
school district shall give provisional teachers appropriate advice and assistance to
help remedy any deficiencies that are detected by the three required observations.
The advice and assistance includes, but is
not limited to, state procedures and programs developed in accordance with § 5926-30. Following this remediation, those
teachers who do not initially perform at
the level required by the evaluation instrument must be observed three more times
and the results of the observations must be
compiled to constitute a second evaluation.
At the end of a one-year provisional
contract period, the evaluation must be
reviewed by the school district to determine if the provisional teacher has performed at the level required by the evaluation instrument. / / the evaluation indicates that the provisional teacher has per-

formed in an adequate manner, the teacher is eligible for an annual contract If
the evaluation indicates that the provisional teacher is deficient in teaching ability,
the school district may employ the teacher
for an additional year under a provisional
contract or the district may terminate his
employment. If employment is terminated, another school district may employ him
under a new one-year provisional cont r a c t — During the one-year provisional
contract period the employment dismissal
provisions of Article 3, Chapter 19, and
Article 5, Chapter 25, of Title 59 of the
1976 Code do not apply. [Emphasis added.]
The plain language of section 59-26-40
requires the School District to provide remedial assistance only in those areas in which
deficiencies are noted during the three required classroom evaluations. Here, Teacher's contract was not renewed based on performance concerns that arose independently
of the evaluation process. Accordingly, section 59-26-40 did not require the School
District to provide remediation in this case.
[2] Moreover, the plain language of section 59-26-40 provides that even though a
provisional teacher receives an evaluation indicating he or she has performed in an adequate manner, the teacher is only "eligible"
for an annual contract. Therefore, the trial
judge properly held that section 59-26-40
does not mandate renewal of a provisional
contract even when a teacher has performed
adequately.
[3,4] Teacher argues that it is against
public policy to allow the School District to
refuse to renew a provisional contract based
on perceived teaching deficiencies when no
remedial action has been afforded. This issue was not raised to or ruled upon by the
trial judge and, therefore, this issue is not
properly before this Court. SSI Medical
Services, Inc. v. Cox, 301 S.C. 493. 392 S.E.2d
789 (1990).
Even if this argument was properly before
the Court, we find it to be without merit.
The Legislature recognized the importance
of training and retaining teachers in section
59-26-40. However, the Legislature did not
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provide for remedial procedures for deficiencies noted outside the evaluations for provisional teachers. In the absence of a statute
mandating remedial procedures for all teaching deficiencies noted during a provisional
contract, we find that the School District's
actions are not inconsistent with the public
policy of this State. Leonard v. Converse
Cmmty School DisU 788 P.2d 1119 (Wyo.
1990).
The holding of the trial judge is
AFFIRMED.
CHANDLER, Acting C.J., FINNEY and
MOORE, JJ., and WILLIAM P. KEESLEY,
Acting Associate Justice, concur.
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Frederick C. Parsons, III and Stephen C.
Ouverson, Surfside Beach, for respondent
Archie Bell Const. Co., Inc.
0. Terfy Beverly, Conway, for respondent
Pat Edwards, d/b/a Edwards Elec, Inc.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
TtfE COURT OF APPEALS
PER CURIAM:
We granted the petition for writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals* decision
in Archie Bell Construction Company, Inc. v.
Fred Patil Norman, et at, — S.C.
, 427
S.E.2d 689 (CtApp.1993). After careful consideration we hereby dismiss the petition of
certiorari as improvidently granted.
Isl David W. Harwell C.J.
/s/ A^Lee Chandler A.J.
/s/ Ernest A. Finney, Jr. A.J.
j*f Sear* K. Tra\ k.1.
is/ Jgnies E. Moore A.J.
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v.
Fred Paul NORMAN and Nan N. Norman;
Pat Edwards, d/b/a Edwards Electric,
Inc.; Dewey Sisk, d/b/a DBS Flooring;
Sonny Rabon, d/b/a Sonny's Plumbing;
Citicorp Homeowners, Inc.; and The Anchor Bank, Defendants,
of whom Fred Paul Norman and Nan
N. Norman are Petitioners,
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John C. DOYLE and Jennifer
G. Doyle, Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND
GUARANTY COMPANY,
Respondent
No. 24114.

and Pat Edwards, d/b/a Edwards Electric,
Inc., is a Respondent.
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No. 24112.

Heard June 7, 1994.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Heard May 5, 1994.
Decided July 5, 1994.
Appeal from Horry County, David F.
Mclnnis, Judge.
John R. Clarke and William Isaac Diggs,
North Myrtle Beach, for petitioners.

Decided July 5, 1994.
After parties agreed to settlement with
third party for wife's job-related injuries,
husband brought action seeking determination of his rights to portion of settlement
based on loss of consortium. The Circuit
Court, Charleston County, Daniel E. Martin,
Sr., J., granted employer's workers' compen-

